Cholesky-VAR impulse responses estimated with post-1984 U.S. data suggest modest macroeconomic reactions to monetary policy shocks. We interpret this evidence by employing an estimated medium-scale DSGE model of the business cycle as Data-Generating Process in a Monte Carlo exercise in which a Cholesky-VAR econometrician is asked to estimate the e¤ects of an unexpected, temporary increase in the policy rate. Our structural DSGE model predicts conventional macroeconomic reactions to a policy shock. Di¤erently, our Monte Carlo VAR results replicate our evidence obtained with actual U.S. data. Hence, modest macroeconomic e¤ects may be an artifact of Cholesky-VARs, more than a genuine fact. A sophisticated combination of supply and demand shocks may be behind the inability of Cholesky-VARs to recover the true macroeconomic responses. The di¤erence in the VAR responses obtained with Great In ‡ation vs. Great Moderation data may be due to instabilities in the parameters related to households' and …rms'programs, more than to a more aggressive systematic monetary policy.
Introduction
Some recent Vector Autoregressions (VARs) empirical investigations dealing with U.S. great moderation data have found modest macroeconomic responses to monetary policy shocks. A non-exhaustive list includes Hanson (2004) , Boivin and Giannoni (2006) , Mojon (2008) , Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) , and Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2010) . Figure 1 replicates this evidence. 1 The bottom panels point to a non-signi…cant reaction of output, and to a quite short-lived negative response of in ‡ation. Very di¤erent results are typically obtained when dealing with samples including the 1970s, and our dataset represents no exception. The top panels in Figure 1 show a signi…cant and positive reaction of in ‡ation (known as the 'price puzzle') and a negative and persistent response of output, as in e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) . Signs of instability in the U.S. macroeconomic reactions to monetary policy shocks have been detected by, among others, Bagliano and Favero (1998) , Hanson (2004) , Boivin and Giannoni (2006) , Mojon (2008) , Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) , and Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2010) .
In light of this stability issue, this paper focuses on the modest reactions conditional on of output during the great moderation. Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) underline the role that technological progress or …nancial innovations may have played in easing households' consumption smoothing, or -again -the improved monetary policy management in the 1980s. Mojon (2008) shows that, once one examines periods without large shifts in the level of in ‡ation as the great moderation, the delayed, persistent e¤ects on in ‡ation often attributed to monetary policy shocks tend to disappear. Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2010) also point to …nancial innovations and a more hawkish monetary policy conduct as possible drivers behind the much more moderate macroeconomic reactions in the post-1984 period.
2 1 Evidence obtained with a trivariate VAR including quarterly GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation, a measure of the output gap produced by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce, and the federal funds rate (average of monthly observations). Giordani (2004) shows that the estimated responses to a monetary policy shock are likely to be biased if a measure of potential output is omitted from the VAR. Robustness checks documented in our Appendix suggest that this qualitative message does not change if a measure of output growth is employed in our VARs. Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2010) con…rm this evidence with Factor-Augmented VARs embedding information coming from large datasets 2 'Econometric'intepretations involve small-sample bias issues, which might be severe in a sample This paper provides an alternative interpretation to the modest reactions shown in Figure 1 . In short, we set up a Monte Carlo exercise in which the Smets and Wouters (2007) model is employed as Data-Generating Process (DGP) to produce arti…cial data which are then given to a Cholesky-VAR econometrician. The Cholesky-VAR econometrician is asked to identify the macroeconomic responses of output and in ‡ation to a monetary policy shock. We show that mild-to-muted responses are very likely to arise even under the null hypothesis of such shocks having the power of a¤ecting in ‡ation and the business cycle, as in Smets and Wouters' (2007) framework. Consequently, a possible interpretation of our responses plotted in Figure 1 (bottom panels) is that those conditional correlations are an artifact, more than a genuine fact. Such an artifact is likely to be due to the timing discrepancy between the true (unknown to the econometrician) DGP and the Cholesky-VAR (CVAR henceforth). This discrepancy induces a distortion in the estimation of the policy shocks, which end up being a linear combination of all the true, structural shocks a¤ecting the economy. Therefore, CVARs pick up a combination of demand and supply shocks whose net e¤ect on in ‡ation and output induces the modest reactions shown in Figure 1 (bottom panels). We then estimate our DGP with U.S. data referring to the great in ‡ation period.
Our posterior estimates document instabilities in the parameters related to households'
and …rms'problems, to the systematic monetary policy conduct, and to the exogenous processes of the structural shocks in the model. Counterfactual simulations are then performed to isolate the subset of parameters which is behind our …ndings. Interestingly, it turns out that the most important instability is the one a¤ecting the parameters of the private sector. Di¤erently, changes in the monetary policy parameters are unlikely to distort the CVAR macroeconomic reactions toward zero. If anything, a more aggressive policy conduct is associated to a stronger reaction of in ‡ation and output in a CVAR context.
Our exercise provides indirect empirical support to the Smets and Wouters'(2007) model. In fact, we show that the data produced with this medium-scale model produce, conditional on CVARs, conditional correlations which are very similar to those obtained with actual U.S. data when treated with the same type of VARs. Importantly, we show that this result is robust to the employment of the growth rate of output (instead of the theoretically-relevant output gap), to di¤erent sample-sizes of arti…cial data to estimate like ours, and the misspeci…cation of the monetary policy shock due to the underestimation of the set of variables the Federal Reserve may have reacted to. On this latter point, see Barakchian and Crowe (2010) , who employ monthly data in their analysis. The relevance of their results at quarterly frequencies as for the great moderation sample is material for future research.
our VARs, and to di¤erent lag-structures of our VARs.
To be clear, this paper does not o¤er any element to 'reject'the CVAR approach.
Indeed, the nice feature of this strategy is that it does not require the researcher to take a position on the identi…cation of other shocks (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) for an extensive discussion on this issue). Moreover, this recursive structure is consistent with structural models of the business cycle recently proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) , Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Lindé (2011) . 3 This paper's goal is instead to show that it is possible to interpret the modest macroeconomic reactions suggested by a number of CVAR exercises in the literature with the help of a non-recursive structural DSGE model widely employed by researchers in the academia and a variety of research institutions worldwide. The paper develops as follows. Section 2 reviews some contributions dealing with similar issues. Section 3 presents the Smets and Wouters (2007) and documents our estimation results. Such model is employed as our DGP in Section 4, which sets up our MonteCarlo experiment. This Section also documents our baseline results. Section 5 attempts to isolate the key parameters behind our modest macroeconomic reactions.
Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
The papers closest to ours are probably Canova and Pina (2005) and Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2009) . Canova and Pina (2005) set up a Monte Carlo exercise in which they consider two calibrated small-scale DSGE models (a limited participation model and a sticky price-sticky wage economy) as DGPs to estimate a variety of short-run 'zero restrictions'VAR identi…cation schemes. They …nd substantial di¤erences between the predictions coming from the structural models and those implied by the estimated CVARs. Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2009) propose a theoretical investigation on the consequences of the timing discrepancy between DSGE and CVARs as for the 3 As a matter of fact, it is unclear if the recursive structure timing assumption is favored by the data as opposed to the contemporaneous timing as in Smets and Wouters (2007) , Benati and Surico (2009), and Canova (2009) , among others. Formal evidence against zero-restrictions as for the reactions of output and in ‡ation to monetary policy surprises is o¤ered by Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007) (as for output) and Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) (in ‡ation) . To the best of our knowledge, however, no empirical test on the relevance of transmission delays (as opposed to contemporaneous e¤ects) in the DSGE modeling context has been proposed so far. We leave this important question to future research. macroeconomic reactions to a monetary policy shock. They show that, depending on the chosen calibration of their DSGE models, CVARs may return a variety of predictions, including price and output puzzles, responses in line with the true DSGE reactions, muted responses, and so on. These papers make a theoretical point. Di¤erently, the relevance of our contribution is due to its empirical content. First, we employ an estimated medium-scale DSGE model of the business cycle as a DGP in our Monte Carlo exercise. Second, we draw a comparison between CVARs' responses estimated with arti…cial vs. actual U.S. data. This enables us to o¤er a novel interpretation of the modest macroeconomic reactions to a monetary policy shock found in a number of recent contributions. Third, we identify the set of parameters responsible for the modest macroeconomic reactions detected in Figure 1 . As anticipated in the Introduction, our results go through even when indicators of the business cycle di¤erent than the output gap are employed in our VAR exercises. Then, our simulations extend the theoretical analysis by Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2009) , who endow the econometrician with the theoretically-relevant output gap. Our analysis should be seen as complementary to the ones proposed by Canova and Pina (2005) Franchi and Paruolo (2012) . Ravenna (2007) analyzes under which conditions a …nite VAR representation exists, and shows that truncated VARs may provide misleading indications when the true DGP is an in…nite order VAR. Franchi and Vidotto (2012) derive a simple way to check whether a DSGE model can be represented by a …nite order VAR. Further investigations on the distortions coming from the truncation bias, in the context of the identi…cation of the e¤ects of technology shocks on hours worked, are o¤ered by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2006) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008) . Our focus is di¤erent, in that we are interested in understanding to what extent the VAR evidence on the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks during the post-Volcker era is driven by the choice of the identi…cation scheme per se. In other words, our ultimate goal is to mimic the behavior of an econometrician endowed with some time series and willing to study the e¤ects of a policy shock with a CVAR.
Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) show that the zero response of prices to a monetary policy shock imposed by a standard Cholesky-identi…cation scheme is not supported by the data when disturbances are inferred using futures data in a two-step procedure. That paper deals, however, with the issue of identi…cation schemes within structural VARs (for which the authors provide econometric testing), but it is silent on structural models. Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Lindé (2011) show that, in presence of a model featuring a lagged transmission mechanism, CVARs perform well.
Our paper complements Altig et al.'s (2011) contribution by scrutinizing the ability of a VAR to recover the true impulse responses under the null hypothesis of a contemporaneous timing being at work. Finally, Leeper and Roush (2003) empirically show that CVARs may return quite di¤erent responses to monetary shocks if the stock of money is a relevant variable in the DGP. With respect to Leeper and Roush (2003) , we do not consider money in our analysis, and we rely on Monte Carlo simulations which enable us to judge the performance of CVARs given our awareness of the true, underlying DGP.
Our Data-Generating Process: Structure and estimation
Our Monte Carlo experiment hinges upon the Smets and Wouters (2007) , which is the framework we will use as our DGP.
Model presentation
The Smets and Wouters (2007) model features a number of nominal and real frictions which are relevant to replicate the features of the main U.S. macroeconomic series. In particular, it models sticky nominal price and wage settings that allow for backwardlooking in ‡ation indexation; habit formation in consumption; investment adjustment costs; variable capital utilization and …xed costs in production. The stochastic dynamics is driven by seven structural shocks, namely a total factor productivity shock, two shocks a¤ecting the intertemporal margin (risk premium shocks and investment-speci…c technology shocks), two shocks a¤ecting the intratemporal margin (wage and price mark-up shocks), and two policy shocks (exogenous spending and monetary policy shocks). In this model, households maximize a nonseparable utility function in consumption and labor over an in…nite life horizon. Consumption appears in the utility function in quasi-di¤erence form with respect to a time-varying external habit variable. Labor is di¤erentiated by a union, so there is some monopoly power over wages, which results in explicit wage equation and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal wages à la Calvo (1983) . Households rent capital services to …rms and decide how much capital to accumulate given the capital adjustment costs they face. The utilization of the capital stock can be adjusted at increasing cost. Firms produce di¤erentiated goods, decide on labor and capital inputs, and set prices conditional on the Calvo model. The Calvo model in both wage and price setting is augmented by the assumption that prices that are not reoptimized are partially indexed to past in ‡ation rates. Prices are therefore set in function of current and expected marginal costs, but are also determined by the past in ‡ation rate. The marginal costs depend on wages and the rental rate of capital.
Similarly, wages depend on past and expected future wages and in ‡ation. The model features, in both goods and labor markets, an aggregator that allows for a time-varying demand elasticity depending on the relative price. Further details can be found in the original paper by Smets and Wouters (2007) .
The log-linearized version of the DSGE model around its steady-state growth path reads as follows:
where variables endowed with a time subscript are log-deviations from the steadystate, and variables without such subscript are at the steady state. The log-linearized aggregate resource constraint (1) features the convolutions c y = 1 g y i y , g y and i y , which stand for the steady-state exogenous spending-output ratio and investmentoutput ratio. In particular, i y = ( 1 + )k y , where is the steady-state growth rate, is the depreciation rate of capital, k y is the steady-state capital-output ratio, and z y = R y k y is the steady-state rental rate of capital. Notice that eq. (16), the one of the stochastic process of the government spending, allows for the productivity shock to a¤ect the log-linearized level of output y t . This is so because exogenous spending, in this model, includes net exports, which may be a¤ected by domestic productivity development. As for the consumption Euler equation (2),
, and c 3 = 1
. Current consump-tion c t is a function of past and expected future consumption, of expected growth in hours worked, of the ex ante real interest rate, and of a disturbance term " b t . Under the assumption of no habits ( = 0) and that of log-utility in consumption ( c = 1), c 1 = c 2 = 0, and we go back to the standard, fully forward-looking Euler equation for consumption. The disturbance term " b t represents a wedge between the interest rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets held by the households. A positive shock to this wedge increases the required return on assets held by the households. At the same time, it increases the cost of capital and it decreases the value of capital and investment (see below). This is basically a shock very similar to a networth shock. This disturbance is assumed to follow a standard AR(1) process. The dynamics of investment i t is captured by the investment Euler equation (3), where
where ' is the steady-state elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function, and is the discount factor applied by households. Notice that capital adjustment costs are a function of the change in investment, rather than its level. This choice is made to introduce additional dynamics in the investment equation, which is useful to capture the hump-shaped response of investment to various shocks. In this equation, the stochastic disturbance " i t represents a shock to the investment-speci…c technology process, and is assumed to follow a standard …rst-order autoregressive process. The value-of-capital arbitrage equation (4) suggests that the current value of the capital stock q t depends positively on its expected future value (with weight q 1 = c (1 )), as well as on the expected real rental rate on capital
and on the ex ante real interest rate and the risk premium disturbance. Eq. (5) is the …rst one of the supply side block. It describes the aggregate production function, which maps output to capital (k s t ) and labor services (l t ). The parameter captures the share of capital in production, and the parameter p is one plus the share of …xed costs in production, re ‡ecting the presence of …xed costs in production. Eq. (6) suggest that the newly installed capital becomes e¤ective with a one-period delay, hence current capital services in production are a function of capital installed in the previous period k t and the degree of capital utilization z t . As stressed by eq. (7), the degree of capital utilization is a positive function of the rental rate of capital, z t = z 1 r k t , where z 1 = (1 )= and is a positive function of the elasticity of the capital utilization adjustment cost function normalized to belong to the [0,1] domain. Eq. (8) describes the accumulation of installed capital k t , featuring the convolutions k 1 = (1 )= and
Installed capital is a function not only of the ‡ow of investment but also of the relative e¢ ciency of these investment expenditures as captured by the investment-speci…c technology disturbance " i t , which follows an autoregressive, stationary process. Eq. (9) relates to the monopolistic competitive goods market. Cost minimization by …rms implies that the price mark-up p t , de…ned as the di¤erence between the average price and the nominal marginal cost or the negative of the real marginal cost, is equal to the di¤erence between the marginal product of labor and the real wage w t , with the marginal product of labor being itself a positive function of the capital-labor ratio and total factor productivity. Pro…t maximization by price-setting …rms gives rise to the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, i.e., eq. (10), with the convolutions being
Notice that, in maximizing their pro…ts, …rm have to face price stickiness à la Calvo (1983) . Firms that cannot reoptimize in a given period index their prices to past in ‡ation. In equilibrium, in ‡ation t depends positively on past and expected future in ‡ation, negatively on the current price mark-up, and positively on a price mark-up disturbance " aggregator " p , and the steady-state mark up, which in equilibrium is itself related to the share of …xed costs in production ( p 1) via a zero-pro…t condition. In particular, when all prices are ‡exible ( p = 0) and the price mark-up shock is zero at all times, eq. (10) reduces to the familiar condition that the price mark-up is constant, or equivalently that there are no ‡uctuations in the wedge between the marginal product of labor and the real wage. Cost minimization by …rms also implies that the rental rate of capital is negatively related to the capital-labor ratio and positively to the real wage (both with unitary elasticity) (see eq. (11)). Similarly, in the monopolistically competitive labor market, the wage mark-up will be equal to the di¤erence between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between working and consuming, an equivalence captured by eq. (12), where is the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage and is the habit parameter in consumption. Eq. (13) shows that real wages adjust only gradually to the desired wage mark-up due to nominal wage stickiness and partial indexation, the convolutions related to this equation being
, and
Notice that if wages are perfectly ‡exible ( w = 0), the real wage is a constant mark-up over the marginal rate os substitution between consumption and leisure. When wage indexation is zero ( w = 0), real wages do not depend on lagged in ‡ation. Notice that, symmetrically with respect to the pricing scheme analyzed earlier, also the wage-mark up disturbance follows an ARMA(1,1) process. The model is closed by eq. (14), which is a ‡exible Taylor rule postulating a systematic reaction by policymakers to current values of in ‡a-tion, the output gap, and output growth. In particular, one of the objects policymakers react to is the output gap, de…ned as a di¤erence between actual and potential output (in logs). Consistently with the DSGE model, potential output is de…ned as the level of output that would prevail under ‡exible prices and wages in the absence of the two mark-up shocks. Then, policymakers engineer movements in the short-run policy rate r t , movements which happen gradually given the presence of interest rate smoothing . Stochastic departures from the Taylor rate, i.e. the rate that would realize in absence of any policy rate shocks, are triggered by a stochastic AR(1) process. Finally, eqs. (15)- (18) de…ne the stochastic processes of the model, which features, as already pointed out, seven shocks (total factor productivity, investment speci…c technology, risk premium, exogenous spending, price mark-up, wage mark-up, and monetary policy). The model features a deterministic growth rate driven by labor-augmenting technological progress.
Model estimation
We estimate the model (1)- (18) with Bayesian methods (see, among others, An and Schorfheide (2007), Canova (2007) ). We work with quarterly U.S. data, sample: 1984:I-2008:II, which roughly begins in correspondence of the great moderation period (McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) ). This sample excludes the acceleration of the …nancial crises, which led the Federal Reserve to implement non-conventional monetary policy moves that are di¢ cult to model with simple-policy rules like the one embedded in our framework. This sample choice enables us to control for variations in in ‡ation dynamics occurred in the post-WWII, which might be due to di¤erent monetary policy regimes being in place (Benati and Surico (2008) , D'Agostino and Surico (2012)). Also, it allows us to control for the possibly time-varying role played by monetary aggregates in shaping the U.S. output dynamics (Castelnuovo (2012) ), and for the impact of breaks in the reduced-form representation of the VARs due to variations in the U.S. systematic monetary policy conduct (Bagliano and Favero (1998) , Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) ).
Importantly, this sample is the one employed to estimate our VAR whose impulse responses motivate this study (see our Figure 1 , bottom panel).
To estimate our model, we employ an updated version of the seven observables used in their original paper by Smets and Wouters (2007) . In particular, we employ the quarterly growth rates of real GDP, real consumption, real investment, and the real wage, log hours worked, the quarterly in ‡ation rate computed with the GDP de ‡ator, and the federal funds rate. The source of the data is the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis'website.
We implement the theoretical restriction on the growth rate of the …rst four variables implied by the common quarterly trend growth rate of the labor-augmenting technological process, i.e., Some of the parameters are di¢ cult to estimate, due to identi…cation issues which are well known as for dynamic-stochastic rational-expectations models like this one (Canova and Sala (2009) ). As in Smets and Wouters (2007) , we then set the depreciation rate = 0:025; the exogenous spending-GDP ratio g y = 0:18; the steady-state mark-up in the labor market w = 1:5; the curvature parameters of the aggregators in the goods and labor market " p and " w to 10. Tables 1 and 2 report our prior densities, which are carefully discussed in the original Smets and Wouters' (2007) paper. Some details of our estimation procedure are reported in the Appendix.
Selected moments and percentiles of our posterior densities are presented in Tables   1 and 2 . Our results are in line with most of the literature focusing on the estimation of DSGE models for the U.S. economy with great moderation data. In particular, we …nd a strong systematic policy reaction to in ‡ation, a mild reaction to the modelconsistent output gap, and a slightly stronger one to output growth. Monetary policy is conducted with a fair amount of gradualism. Our evidence points to a fairly large degree of habit formation in consumption, and lends support to the modeling of frictions in capital formation. The posterior means of the Calvo price and wage parameters are comparable with a large number of estimates obtained with macroeconomic U.S. data.
Shocks to TFP, Government spending, price and wage mark-ups feature a high degree of correlation, also considering the MA(1) component of these last two shocks.
DSGE vs. CVARs: A MonteCarlo exercise
We now turn to our Monte Carlo exercise. Basically, we aim at comparing the DSGEconsistent impulse responses to those produced with a VAR whose monetary policy shock is identi…ed by a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals. As it is typically done in this literature, "slow-moving" variables such as in ‡ation and output are ordered before the policy rate. This implies that i) monetary policy shocks cannot hit in ‡ation and output in the very short run (contemporaneously); ii) shocks to in ‡ation and output enter the interest rate equation
contemporaneously.
The Monte Carlo algorithm
We calibrate the Smets and Wouters (2007) [3xT ] stands for the matrix containing information on 3 arti…cial time series of dimension T ) with our DGP by sampling realizations from the mutually independent densities of all our structural shocks in each given period. A burn-in of 400 observations is considered; 2. estimate a reduced-form VAR(3) and identify the monetary policy shock by imposing a Cholesky-structure on the short-run mapping going from the reduced-form residuals to the structural shocks of the VAR (ordering: in ‡ation, output gap, nominal rate); 4 4 The choice of using three lags in our baseline exercise is due to our willingness of keeping our Monte Carlo VARs as close as possible to the ones estimated with actual U.S. data and via which we produced our Figure 1 . Our results are robust to perturbations of the number of lags of our Monte Carlo VARs (discussion proposed in Section 4.2). Notice that, if we were interested into getting results in population, we could skip the MonteCarlo experiments. In fact, we could compute autocovariances from our linear DSGE models. Then, we could compute VAR population coe¢ cients. From these we could compute IRFs and the composition of the VAR monetary policy shock in terms of the structural shocks. 
Monte Carlo results
Figure 2 contrasts the impulse responses obtained with the DSGE model with those generated with our CVARs. The estimated DSGE model predicts an immediate recession, with the output level getting back to potential after some quarters. Such recession leads to a persistent de ‡ationary phase, which lasts for more than two years. Evidently, our estimated model suggests that U.S. monetary policy shocks do a¤ect in ‡ation and output.
A dramatically di¤erent picture arises when turning to our CVARs. On average, our CVARs return modest and insigni…cant responses of in ‡ation and output to a monetary policy shock. The similarity between the CVAR responses shown in Figure 2 and those reported in Figure 1 (bottom panels) is substantial. In both cases, a monetary policy 'shock'identi…ed with the Cholesky-scheme induces modest reactions of in ‡ation and output. Consequently, our MonteCarlo evidence suggests that the mild-to-muted reactions reported in Figure 1 , more than a genuine fact, may actually be an artifact due to the imposition of the (wrong) Cholesky identi…cation scheme. To reiterate, mild-to-muted CVAR responses to a (misspeci…ed) monetary policy shock are in principle fully consistent with a monetary policy actually able to a¤ect the macroeconomic environment.
However, the evidence in Figure 1 (2007)) and the assessment of the macroeconomic e¤ects of some key macroeconomic shocks (Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007)). Our results support the relevance of previous results based on small-scale, calibrated models (Canova and Pina (2005)) and theoretical investigations (Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2009) ) on the possible drawbacks of using Cholesky-identi…cation schemes in VAR exercises.
Such drawbacks are due to the fact that, as stressed in the Introduction, if a recursive scheme is wrongly imposed on data generated by a non-recursive DSGE model, the impulse responses may end up being severely distorted because of the in ‡uence of 'extrashocks'with respect to the one the econometrician is after. To unveil the participation of each structural disturbance to the amalgamated CVAR 'shock', we compute the correlation between our VAR monetary policy shocks and the structural shocks in our DSGE framework. Figure 3 plots the distributions of such correlations. As it is evident, a number of shocks enter the linear combination forming the CVAR monetary policy 'shock'. Notice the role played by the TFP shock. The loading of the TFP shock is, on average, negative. Given the nature of this shock, which is a supply shock, the response of in ‡ation is dampened by negative realizations of TFP disturbances. On the other hand, a negative TFP shock should reinforce the negative reaction of output in the short run. However, three 'demand' shocks, i.e., risk-premium, Government spending, and investment-speci…c shocks, correlate positively with the monetary policy shock, so contrasting the e¤ects of a monetary policy shock on in ‡ation and output. The correlation between the CVAR and the DSGE monetary policy shocks is positive and large, as expected. As far as our mark-up shocks are concerned, the price mark-up shock correlates negatively with the CVAR monetary policy shock, therefore contrasting the e¤ect of a genuine monetary policy tightening on output and reinforcing that on in ‡ation. Di¤erently, the wage mark-up shock displays a weak correlation with the CVAR monetary policy shock (on average). Wrapping up, the CVAR monetary policy 'shock' represents a linear combination of a variety of structural shocks, whose joint e¤ect is that of dampening in ‡ation and output responses to a genuine monetary policy shock.
Robustness checks. Our exercise assumes our econometrician to be endowed with the correct knowledge of the DSGE-consistent output gap. We share this assumption with Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2009) , who work with a three-equation DSGE framework and document the performance of CVARs under di¤erent scenarios. In their case, the solution of the model under rational expectations is a VAR(2), because all the relevant state variables are included in the vector (Ravenna (2007) ). This assumption is, however, unpalatable, because the true potential output process is hardly known by the econometrician. We then relax it by substituting the output gap with the growth rate of output in our exercises. In particular, we i) re-estimate our VARs with actual U.S. data in order to understand if the modest responses in Figure 1 (bottom panels) stay the same when this alternative vector is considered; ii) re-do our Monte Carlo simulations accordingly. Our results turn out to be robust to the employment of the growth rate of output.
Another issue regards our approximation of the dynamics of in ‡ation, output, and the policy rate. Our VAR(3) approximation may not be adequate to capture the VARMA structure of the model. We then re-run our Monte Carlo exercise by employing a VAR(10). If some relevant dynamics is not well-captured by our VAR(3), the impulse responses conditional on VAR(10)-models should di¤er from our baseline ones. Clearly, also the small-sample bias may be an issue, because 98 observations are not necessarily enough to correctly characterize the dynamics of the macroeconomic series of our interest. Again, if the small-sample bias is a serious issue for our exercise, our impulse responses should look quite di¤erent conditional on VARs estimated with much larger samples. We then re-run our Monte Carlo simulations by endowing the econometrician with 1,000 observations per each arti…cial dataset. Our results turn out to be robust to these further robustness checks. All our robustness checks are documented in our Appendix, which is available upon request.
Behind the scenes: Possible drivers at work
The results of our Monte Carlo exercise shown in Figure 2 mimic the conditional correlations obtained with actual U.S. data and shown in Figure 1 , bottom panels. Hence, the Smets and Wouters model can be fruitfully employed to identify the reasons behind our 'mild-to-muted'macroeconomic reactions documented in Figure 1 . As pointed our in our Introduction, di¤erent explanations have been proposed for such reactions. They mainly relate to changes in the policy parameters, variations in the parameters strictly related to the private sector, and the more moderate shocks'volatility.
To shed light on the relative importance of di¤erent subset of parameters in this model, we partition the vector of structural parameters of our DSGE model as follows: To calibrate the changes in the structural parameters, we re-estimate the model (1)- (18) Figure 4 plots the mean responses to a monetary policy shock in our baseline case and in our four counterfactual scenarios. The change in structural parameters appear to be the most in ‡uential driver behind our CVAR responses. According to our simulations, if the parameters of the private sector had not changed when moving from the great in ‡ation period to the great moderation phase, CVAR analysis would have been more likely to predict a recession after a monetary policy shock. Qualitatively, the same result holds as for the reaction of in ‡ation. Admittedly, however, the quantitative impact of the change in private sector parameters on the response of in ‡ation turns out to be much milder. Di¤erently, the persistence coe¢ cients of the ARMA processes and the magnitude of the structural shocks seem to play a negligible role as for our responses.
Finally, according to our simulations, a weaker monetary policy would have inducedceteris paribus -a milder reaction of our CVARs. Hence, our simulations show that i) the change in parameters associated to households'and …rms'problems may be one of the factors pushing the responses of in ‡ation and, above all, output toward zero; ii) the aggressive monetary policy implemented by Federal Reserve since the early 1980s is unlikely to be a major factor behind such modest reactions.
Admittedly, two assumptions are clearly problematic as for this analysis. First, in running our counterfactual exercises, we assume our estimated parameters to be mutually independent, as it is often done in the literature. This practice, however, does not take into account the fact that the set of parameters characterizing our counterfactual scenarios may be associated to a low likelihood (Canova (2009)) . Second, our model features a Ricardian …scal policy. Leeper (1991) 
Conclusions
This paper shows that evidence of modest macroeconomic responses to monetary policy shocks produced with Cholesky-VARs that are estimated with U.S. great moderation data may be consistent with substantial macroeconomic e¤ects triggered by unexpected moves in the policy nominal interest rate. We make this point by proceeding in two steps. First, we estimate a medium-scale new-Keynesian DSGE model with Bayesian techniques, and verify that it predicts a persistent reaction of in ‡ation and output to an unexpected monetary policy tightening. Then, we set up a Monte Carlo experiment in which we feed Cholesky-VARs with pseudo-data generated by our estimated new-Keynesian framework. We show that Cholesky-VARs return, on average, modest responses of in ‡ation and output. Our results is due to the mismatch existing between the timing implied by Cholesky-identi…cation scheme and the one suggested by our non-recursive Data-Generating Process. As a consequence, various shocks are shown to contaminate the true e¤ects of monetary policy shocks on output and in ‡ation. The calibration of parameters related to households'and …rms'structural equations is shown to be possibly more important than that of the monetary policy rule in understanding our results.
Which are the implications of our study? 
